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This symposium, comprising six articles in addition to this one, was triggered
by a spate of Supreme Court opinions occurring over the last seven years, all of
which raise the two questions in the title to this article (which is also the title of the
symposium). Since 1974, when United States v. Calandra' definitively established
deterrence as the primary objective of the suppression remedy, the Court has
nibbled away at the exclusionary rule from a number of different directions.2 But
the Court's decisions in Hudson v. Michigan (2006), Herring v. United States
(2009),4 and Davis v. United States (201 1)5 reveal a Court that is now willing to
take much larger bites out of the rule, and perhaps even swallow it whole.
Justice Scalia began the feast in his majority opinion in Hudson, which held
that the suppression remedy does not apply to violation of the Fourth
Amendment's knock-and-announce rule.6 In rebutting Hudson's argument that
exclusion was a crucial means of ensuring police adherence to that rule, Justice
Scalia stated, "We cannot assume that exclusion in this context is necessary
deterrence simply because we found that it was necessary deterrence in different
contexts and long ago."7 He pointed out that, since Mapp v. Ohio first applied the
exclusionary rule to the states, statutes and caselaw have facilitated civil suits both
for Fourth Amendment violations and for failure to train officers about the Fourth
Amendment, and that Congress has now authorized attorneys' fees as a means of
encouraging such suits even in cases involving minimal damages.9 An additional
reason to reconsider the exclusionary remedy, Scalia asserted, is "the increasing
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal discipline,"
which is often combined with improved training programs designed "to teach
Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
2 Id. at 347 ("the rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."). Of
course, there were forerunners of Calandra, including Mapp itself. See infra text accompanying
notes 46-48.
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
4 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
Davis v. United States,131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
6 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 599.
' Id. at 597.
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
9 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 597-98.
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officers and their supervisors what is required of them under this Court's cases."' 0
Perhaps most chilling to proponents of the rule, however, was Justice Scalia's
observation that even if none of these devices is in fact an effective deterrent, the
Court has considered them sufficient remedies for other types of police violations,
such as police abuse and denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel after the
suspect has already lawfully confessed." "Many would regard these violated
rights as more significant than the right not to be intruded upon," Justice Scalia
opined, "and yet nothing but 'ineffective' civil suit is available as a deterrent."' 2
At least these last ruminations could be written off as fanciful dicta. In
Herring, the Court got more specific, in an opinion refusing to suppress evidence
obtained during a search incident to an arrest based on an unconstitutionally stale
warrant.' 3  The Court has long recognized that exclusion is less likely to be
required when the police are acting in "objectively reasonable reliance" on a
warrant or similar outside authority and thus are less likely to be deterred by the
prospect of losing evidence they find.14 But in Herring, Chief Justice Roberts
appeared to reach well beyond those situations when he stated that "[t]he extent to
which the exclusionary rule is justified by . .. deterrence principles varies with the
culpability of the law enforcement conduct." 5  Thus, he reasoned, while "the
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct,
or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence," it is not meant to deter
simply negligent conduct in individual cases.' 6  This language suggests that
Roberts, and perhaps the four justices who joined in his opinion, are ready to
extend the good faith exception to warrantless searches and seizures.17
That possibility came closer to fruition in Davis, where the Court held that
evidence obtained during a warrantless search in good faith reliance on existing
Fourth Amendment law is not subject to exclusion even if the suspect has a
persuasive argument that the rule should be changed in his favor. In response to
the argument that this holding would discourage challenges to Fourth Amendment
law by litigants who would gain nothing from winning, Justice Alito's majority
opinion, which at least six justices joined, stated that the exclusionary rule is only
'0 Id at 598-99.
" Id at 597-98.
12 Id at 597.
13 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147-48 (2009).
14 See infra note 54.
" 555 U.S. at 143.
1 Id. at 144.
1 The language also suggests that even if application of the rule would deter in a given
situation, its imposition should be limited by the officer's blameworthiness. See, e.g., United States v.
Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 256 n.34 (2012) (police extraction of DNA profile from clothing of person for
whom they did not have probable cause was not "culpable" because there was no evidence of
systemic violations, and therefore exclusion should not occur).
18 Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2429 (2011).
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meant to deter misconduct, not "facilitat[e] the overruling of precedent." 9 While
Justice Alito went on to describe ways in which Fourth Amendment doctrine might
still be challenged despite the ruling in Davis,20 his resistance to the idea that the
rule is a mechanism for fine-tuning the law demonstrates the dominance of the
deterrence rationale. As Justice Scalia stated in Hudson for a majority of the
Court, exclusion appears to be the Court's "last resort" not its "first impulse."2 1
On its face, none of this signals that the Court will abandon the exclusionary
rule entirely. The suppression remedy has been thought to be in grave danger
before, but it has managed to survive.22 Nonetheless, a number of commentators
suspect that this latest line of decisions finally signals the beginning of the end for
the rule. Many of the authors in this symposium agree. And all of them take a
position on whether, if the rule were abolished or more significantly undermined,
that development would be a good thing. In the course of doing so, all six articles
manage to say something new and provocative, despite the vast amount of
literature on the exclusionary rule that already exists. 24 This brief introduction to
the symposium sets up their discussion of both of the questions posed by the
symposium's title, and ends with a few observations from a comparative
perspective.
I. IS THE RULE ON THE WAY OUT?: A VERY SHORT HISTORY
Even in colonial days courts may have, in rare instances, excluded illegally
25
seized evidence. During the next century, a few state courts began to routinely
dismiss cases because of illegal searches.26 But the first Supreme Court case to
require exclusion did not come until 1886, over a century after the Constitution
SId at 2432.
20 Id. at 2433.
21 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
22 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Exclusionary Rule and Causation: Hudson v. Michigan
and Its Ancestors, 93 IOWA L. REv. 1741, 1985 (2008) (stating that the Court's adoption of the
inevitable discovery exception to the rule in 1984 unleashed "a virus capable of killing" the rule).
23 TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXCLUSIONARY
RULE 346 (2012) ("the current Court appears positioned to repeal the exclusionary rule altogether.");
Craig Bradley, Reconceiving the Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule, 73 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., 211, 217 (Winter 2010) (stating that a majority of the Court has decided "that the
exclusionary rule must be reconsidered.").
24 Professor Taslitz reports that, based on his Westlaw search, almost 400 articles have
focused on the rule. Andrew E. Taslitz, Hypocrisy, Corruption, and Illegitimacy: Why Judicial
Integrity Justfies the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 419, 422 n.14 (2013).
25 See Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45
GoNz. L. REv. 1, 14-20 (2009-10).
26 Wesley Oliver, The Neglected History of Criminal Procedure, 1850-1940, 62 RUTGERS L.
REv. 442, 504 (2010) ("In several state courts, including New York, courts in the mid-nineteenth
century began excluding alcohol discovered with defective warrants [and as] police searches grew
much more frequent" exclusion spread to other types of cases).
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was ratified. In Boyd v. United States,27 the Court held that use at trial of private
papers obtained from the accused through a subpoena ordering their production
violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled testimony and thus
was also unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 28  Three decades later, in
Weeks v. United States,29 the Court untethered exclusion from the Fifth
Amendment, stating simply that the government must return (prior to adjudication)
any illegally seized property over which the accused has a superior property
interest. 30
While Boyd and Weeks established an exclusionary principle, neither
decision's reasoning, taken literally, provided a remedy for the typical target of an
illegal search and seizure. Since Boyd only applied to seizure of "testimonial"
evidence such as documents (given the language of the Fifth Amendment 3 ) and
since Weeks only applied to property legitimately owned by the accused, exclusion
did not occur under these cases if the illegally seized evidence was contraband or
non-testimonial fruit of crime.32 Furthermore, because at the time these cases were
decided the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were thought to apply solely to the
federal government, Boyd and Weeks only affected federal prosecutions, not state
cases, where the lion's share of crimes are adjudicated. 3
The first obstacle to exclusion was fairly quickly removed in Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States.34 There Justice Holmes asserted that, without the
exclusionary remedy, the Fourth Amendment would be "a form of words,"
language that strongly suggested that suppression of illegally seized evidence is
27 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
28 Id. at 633 ("the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the fourth amendment
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which
in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the
question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the fourth
amendment").
29 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
30 Id. at 396 (previous caselaw admitting illegally obtained evidence "affords no authority for
the action of the court in this case, when applied to in due season for the return of papers seized in
violation of the Constitutional Amendment").
3 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself").
32 Cf Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921) (stating the "when a valid exercise
of the police power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it
may be taken," a warrant-based search is permissible).
33 See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951) (7-1 decision) ("We hold that the
federal courts should refuse to intervene in State criminal proceedings to suppress the use of evidence
even when claimed to have been secured by unlawful search and seizure.").
3 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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constitutionally required regardless of its nature. 35 Other cases decided in the
1920s reinforced that position. 36 By 1928, Justice Brandeis felt able to declare that
"the government itself would become a lawbreaker" unless all illegally seized
evidence were excluded.
The second obstacle to exclusion took longer to overcome. Despite the high-
sounding language of Justices Holmes and Brandeis suggesting that the
exclusionary rule was a fundamental right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause, the Court resisted applying the rule to state
cases for almost half a century after Weeks, except when the police action was so
egregious that it "shocks the conscience."38 At the Supreme Court level, this
perilous state of affairs was discovered only once, in Rochin v. California,3 9 where
police used a stomach pump to flush out drugs swallowed by a suspect.40 In
contrast, run-of-the-mill illegalities, the Court declared in Wolf v. Colorado,4' did
not require exclusion as a constitutional matter, primarily because the rest of the
world and most of the states had not adopted the rule, thus demonstrating that the
exclusionary remedy was not thought to be "essential" to "ordered liberty."42
It was only after another seven states had decided exclusion was a necessary
sanction for violation of Fourth Amendment rules that the Court reversed itself,43
although its reason for doing so was not entirely clear. The Court's decision in
Mapp v. Ohio" initially echoed Holmes and Brandeis in stating that "the plain and
unequivocal language of Weeks-and its later paraphrase in Wolf-to the effect
that the Weeks rule is of constitutional origin, remains entirely undisturbed."45 This
language reinforcing the constitutional basis of the rule appeared to endorse the
idea that the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of illegally seized evidence
regardless of its effect on the police.
3 Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392 (Holmes, J.) See also id. ("The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.").
36 See, e.g., Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (excluding contraband cocaine);
Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (excluding contraband liquor).
3 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 483 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also id
at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil that some
criminals should escape than that the Government should play an ignoble part.").
38 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
39 Id
40 Id. at 166.
4' 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
42 Id. at 27-29 (holding that the "core" of the Fourth Amendment is "implicit in the 'concept
of ordered liberty' but that "[w]hen we find that in fact most of the English-speaking world does not
regard as vital to such protection the exclusion of evidence thus obtained, we must hesitate to treat
this remedy as an essential ingredient of the right" and noting that 30 out of 47 states rejected Weeks).
43 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224-32 (Appendix) (1960) (app.).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
45 Id at 649.
2013] 345
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMANAL LAW
However, Mapp also discussed the efficacy of the rule. While "not basically
relevant to a decision that the exclusionary rule is an essential ingredient of the
Fourth Amendment," the fact that, in the experience of a majority of states, other
remedies for illegal searches and seizures had proven "worthless and futile" was
important enough to be noted by the majority.46 Later in the opinion, the Court
cited Elkins v. United States4 7 for the proposition that "the purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in
the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."' 48
In subsequent cases, this latter language, far from remaining "basically
irrelevant," became the focal point of the Court's analysis. Twelve years after
Mapp, the Court's decision in United States v. Calandra49 declared that "the rule's
prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the
guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures."50
By the time of United States v. Leon51 a majority of the Court was willing to
respond to Justice Brandeis' assertion that the rule is also meant to assure judicial
clean hands with the statement "Our cases establish that the question whether the
use of illegally obtained evidence in judicial proceedings represents judicial
participation in a Fourth Amendment violation and offends the integrity of the
courts 'is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve-a
deterrent purpose."' 52
Relying on the deterrence rationale, the Court has since significantly reduced
the situations in which the rule applies in three contexts: (1) secondary process
cases; (2) good faith cases; and (3) attenuated fruit cases. First, the Court has
reasoned that when police know that illegally seized evidence will be excluded in
the prosecution's case-in-chief, any additional deterrence that might result from
also preventing use of the evidence in civil proceedings, collateral criminal
proceedings or to impeach a defendant at trial is minimal and does not justify
suppression. Second, as Herring and Davis illustrate, the Court has concluded
that when the police reasonably rely on a third-party source such as a magistrate,
4 Id. at 651-52.
47 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
48 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217).
49 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
'0 Id. at 347.
51 United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
52 Id. at 921 n.22.
5 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (parole revocation proceedings);
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984) (civil deportation
proceedings); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (use for impeachment); United States v.
Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976) (IRS proceedings); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (habeas
proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand jury proceedings).
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court clerk, or previous precedent, exclusion will provide little deterrent effect.5 4
Finally, the Court has held that when the connection between evidence and the
illegal search or seizure that led to its discovery is so attenuated that the illegality
probably was not perpetrated in order to obtain the evidentiary fruit, the deterrent
effect of the rule is unlikely to operate.
A perceived lack of deterrent effect is not the Court's only basis for creating
exceptions to the exclusionary rule, however. The Court has also recognized at
least three exceptions to the rule in situations where exclusion probably would
deter, if it deters at all. First, exclusion is not permitted when the illegality did not
infringe the defendant's own Fourth Amendment interests, even when the police
who commit the violation know that this standing rule will prevent a challenge to
their actions.56 Second, if the government can show that illegally seized evidence
would eventually have been discovered through legal means, exclusion is not
necessary even if the police acted in bad faith, on the ground that suppression of
evidence that inevitably would have found legally would put the police in a worse
position than if the illegality had not occurred. Third, exclusion is inapposite
when it would not serve "the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee"
even if the police intentionally violated the guarantee to secure evidence." It is this
latter exception that best explains Hudson, where the Court concluded that the
knock-and-announce requirement is meant to protect against violence and property
destruction, not illegal seizure of evidence.59
54 See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995) (reliance on court records); Illinois v. Krull,
480 U.S. 340 (1987) (reliance on statute); Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (reliance
on warrant); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (reliance on statute).
s5 As originally formulated, attenuation doctrine relied on much more than deterrence. See
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04 (1975). But its later manifestations are consistent with a
deterrence rationale. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 475 (1980) (illegal arrest did not
require exclusion of subsequent identification because police learned of victim and defendant's
identity before the arrest); United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 276 n.4 (1978) (illegal search did
not require exclusion of witness discovered as a result of search in part because search not conducted
"for the specific purpose of discovering potential witnesses").
56 United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) (stating, in a case in which officers
admitted conducting an illegal search knowing that the target would not have standing, that "our
Fourth Amendment decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
victim of the challenged practices.").
s7 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984) (rejecting a bad faith limitation on the inevitable
discovery doctrine).
ss See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 72 n.3 (1998) (indicating, in dictum, that
even if destruction of property in the course of a search violates the Fourth Amendment, the fruit of
the search is not necessarily inadmissible); New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 20 (1990) (refusing to
suppress a statement taken at the stationhouse made after an illegal warrantless home arrest, on the
ground that "suppressing the statement taken outside the house would not serve the purpose of the
rule that made Harris' in-house arrest illegal").
5 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006) ("The interests protected by the knock-and-
announce requirement are quite different [from the warrant requirement]-and do not include the
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These six exceptions have made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule a
mockery of the original version established in the early twentieth century. It may
be true, as Justice Kennedy insisted in Hudson, that "the continued operation of the
exclusionary rule, as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt."6 o But
the version of the rule that exists today is a far cry from the rule after Silverthorne,
and at least five justices appear willing to increase that distance further.
All of the authors in this symposium believe the exclusionary rule is in
trouble. But not all think it will expire soon. On the pessimistic side, Professor
Taslitz thinks that "[t]he rule may [still] be one vote away from dying, but its
current life force is unquestionably on the wane."61  Professor Cloud states the
Supreme Court's rulings "have transmogrified the exclusionary remedy from a
core element of Fourth Amendment rights into a nuisance."62 Professor Myers
concludes that "[t]he Supreme Court appears ready to accept a move away from
mandatory exclusion in favor of a more graduated response, if there is an effective
substitute. Or, possibly, without one."63 On the more optimistic side, Professor
Sundby speaks of the rule's "staying power,"64 Professor Rosenthal also appears to
believe the rule will not disappear in the near future, 65 and Professor Clancy, while
stating that the rule is at its "nadir," suggests that the current antipathy toward the
suppression remedy may be temporary, especially in light of what is happening in
state courts.66
II. SHOULD THE RULE BE ON THE WAY OUT?
Although split about the rule's future, all but one of the symposium authors
believe the rule should continue to exist in its "mandatory" form, either because, as
Silverthorne held, the Constitution requires it, or because it is the remedy that
shielding of potential evidence from the government's eyes."). Justice Scalia's majority opinion also
purportedly discussed a lack-of-deterrence rationale, but in fact his argument was simply that knock-
and-announce violations are not worth deterring. Id. at 596 ("ignoring knock-and-announce can
realistically be expected to achieve absolutely nothing except the prevention of destruction of
evidence and the avoidance of life-threatening resistance by occupants of the premises.").
60 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
61 Taslitz, supra note 24, at 420.
62 Morgan Cloud, A Conservative House Divided: How the Post-Warren Court Dismantled
the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 475, 476 (2013).
63 Richard E. Myers II, Fourth Amendment Small Claims Court, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 567,
574 (2013).
6 Scott E. Sundby, Everyman's Exclusionary Rule: The Exclusionary Rule and the Rule of
Law (or Why Conservatives Should Embrace the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 393, 394
(2013).
65 Lawrence Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO
ST. J. CIuM. L. 523, 566 (2013) (the exclusionary rule may be "the devil we know").
6 Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right,
10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 357, 358 (2013).
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comes closest to achieving optimal deterrence. Before describing these positions
in more detail, I should note that my own view is different. Some years ago I
argued that none of the theories that seek to ground the exclusionary rule in the
Constitution hold water, except perhaps the idea that the due process clause bans
egregious police misconduct, which would at most require a narrow version of the
rule. I also argued that the exclusionary rule is not very effective at curbing
police misconduct, and that meaningful deterrence of illegality could be better
achieved through a damages regime holding miscreant police personally liable
(without indemnification) at a liquidated rate when they act in bad faith, and
holding the department liable at the same rate when the police violation is
negligent.68 I asserted that this proposal:
should bring more effective protection of everyone's Fourth Amendment
interests, through greater police adherence to the law [because police
would be directly liable for bad faith actions], simplification of that law
[through avoidance of nit-picky suppression motions], invigorated judicial
review [by routinely bringing to the judiciary's attention illegal searches
and seizures of innocent people], improved hiring, training, and
supervision of officers [by departments wanting to reduce costly negligent
illegalities], and the increased use of warrants [by police wanting to
immunize themselves from liability]. It should also reduce racial tensions
[through discouraging street harassment by police worried about personal
liability], cut down on useless investigations of low-level victimless crime
[ditto], promote innovative, problem-solving police work [that avoids
searches and seizures], and encourage stronger departmental reactions to
rogue officers who ultimately cost the system money and respect.69
This is a lot to defend and it took me over 80 pages to do so. I will not
rehearse the supporting arguments any further here, but rather refer the reader to
those pages.
In contrast, four of the six authors in this symposium subscribe to the
"majestic conception" of the exclusionary rule-the idea that the rule does have a
constitutional basis and that deterrence is not the primary goal of the rule. 70 Each
of these authors takes a slightly different slant on the issue. After detailing the
Court's recent exclusionary rule cases and state court decisions that diverge from
those cases, Professor Clancy says the rule has to be "part of the constitutional
67 Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 363, 425 (1999).
6 Id. at 387-389.
69 Id. at 445-46.
70 The "majestic conception" phrase comes from Justice Stevens dissenting opinion in
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 18 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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right" because, as the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison,71 "[t]he very
essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim
the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." 72 Professor Sundby
elaborates on this theme by arguing that suppression of illegally seized evidence is
a manifestation of this country's allegiance to the rule of law, an allegiance that
law-and-order types should share. To Sundby, the rule ensures "the ability of
ordinary citizens to invoke the law on their behalf in everyday courts."74 Professor
Taslitz provides a robust defense of the rule-as-judicial-integrity argument,
contending that, given the inefficacy of alternatives to the rule, its abandonment
would be rank judicial hypocrisy.75 The rule is needed, he asserts, to ensure "(1) a
wholeness among judicial words, motivations, and deeds; (2) judicial
accountability for these things; (3) the parties' perception of fair procedures,
especially the opportunity for effective voice (voice that might make a real
difference) about constitutional claims; and (4) the informed public's perception
that the courts' actions are legitimate because they reflect the preceding three
conditions, not necessarily because the public agrees with any particular court
decision."7 6 Finally, Professor Cloud suggests that the reason the rule is in decline
is not only because of changing ideological preferences on the Court but because
of a penchant, even among "liberal" justices, for pragmatic thinking.77 To
Professor Cloud, the Court's approach to both the rule and the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence it implements has "replaced primary rules that limited the authority
of government agents with a hopelessly vague formula lacking substantive legal
content."78 He argues in favor of what he perceives to be more traditional analysis
that relies on implementing foundational rights (in particular property rights) that
are not susceptible to balancing.
Professors Rosenthal and Myers are not as convinced of the exclusionary
rule's constitutional bona fides and instead focus on its efficacy at enforcing the
Fourth Amendment. Professor Rosenthal takes as a given that, in light of the
language of the Fourth Amendment and contemporary doctrine, exclusion is not
constitutionally required, and he rebuts several arguments to the contrary.80
Professor Myers "assumes that the Court remains committed to the view that the
exclusionary rule is mandated only so long as it is the only tool the courts have to
" 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
72 Clancy, supra note 66, at 390 (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163).
73 Sundby, supra note 64, at 398-99.
74 Id. at 398.
7 Taslitz, supra note 24, at 423.
76 Id.
n Cloud, supra note 62, at 506-07.
7Id. at 492.
7 See id. at 521.
8o Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 523-30.
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encourage law enforcement to follow the Fourth Amendment."" While both
authors thus believe that deterrence should be the rule's goal, they differ in their
conclusions about whether it achieves that objective. Professor Rosenthal provides
a closely reasoned account of why other remedies, and damages in particular,
either cannot accomplish as much deterrence as exclusion can or will over-deter
legitimate police investigations. 82  Professor Myers, in contrast, suggests an
experiment with "small-claims courts" that would, similar to my proposal, allow
judges to fine offending officers while reserving exclusion for bad faith
illegalities.83
These articles left me still wondering about both the majestic conception of
the rule and its efficacy as a deterrent. For instance, one might well ask why a
damages proceeding in open court against the offending police officer and the
department does not satisfy the remedial, rule-of-law and judicial-integrity
concerns of Clancy, Sundby, and Taslitz. While these authors appear to believe
that a viable damages action simply isn't feasible in today's climate,84 the rule's
existence has given governments little reason to try to fashion such a regime.
Furthermore, as Professor Myers points out,85 whatever it might do for Fourth
Amendment law, exclusion clearly undermines the remedial, rule-affirmation and
legitimizing aspects of the substantive criminal law, not only because it blatantly
allows guilty people to go free, but because even in those cases that can proceed
without the excluded evidence, the resulting plea bargains and trials do not reflect
the known facts. That may be why exclusion is so unlikely to occur in serious
cases.86
It is also interesting to note that most of the decisions in which the lower
courts and the Supreme Court developed the majestic conception of the
exclusionary rule involved bootlegging and gambling, where dismissal of the
charges was fairly easy to countenance. In contrast, Mapp ensured that the Court
81 Myers, supra note 63, at 568.
82 Rosenthal, supra note 64, at 537-66.
83 Myers, supra at 570.
84 See, e.g., Taslitz, supra note 24, at 425-30 (giving reasons why damages actions aren't
effective remedies). But see Myers, supra note 63, at 595 (suggesting why his damages proposal
would be palatable politically).
85 Myers, supra note 63, at 581 (exclusion means that "the courts have to spend their
legitimacy as a truth-finding institution to purchase police compliance").
86 See Peter Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the Exclusionary Rule Revisited, U. ILL. L. REv.
223, 234-35 (finding that over 80% of cases dismissed because of the rule involved minor crimes
such as possession of small amounts of marijuana or cocaine, obscenity, or petty larceny and that "the
vast majority [of suspects] would never have been given detention time" had they been convicted).
87 Consider the crimes involved in the Court's seminal exclusionary rule cases prior to and
including Mapp: Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (customs violation); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (violation of lottery law); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920) (conspiracy to defraud the government); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921)
(liquor law violation); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (cocaine possessed in violation
of a tax law); and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (illegal gambling). See also Oliver, supra note
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would get a steady diet of cases involving the types of crimes routinely litigated in
state courts, like murder, robbery and burglary,88 cases that had to be decided
under Fourth Amendment rules largely originating in the daintier Prohibition-era
environment.89 It would not be surprising if this development influenced the
Court's movement away from the majestic rationale for exclusion. In fact, even
before Chief Justice Burger took office and the ideological balance on the Court
shifted, it members were backtracking on the rule. In Linkletter v. Walker,9 0 seven
members of the Court refused to apply the rule retroactively after balancing the
low deterrent value of such a holding against the number of people it might release
(including Linkletter, a burglar),91 and in Alderman v. United States,92 Six Out of
the eight deliberating members of the Court refused to adopt the defendant-friendly
target standing rule in a case involving individuals charged with "murderous
threats."93 In other words, most Warren Court justices became "pragmatists" in
Fourth Amendment cases, in my view understandably so, once the real costs of
exclusion became apparent.
The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule is also subject to endless
debate.94 If the rule were a good deterrent, one would expect search and seizure
practices to generate more evidence than the six to ten percent hit rate routinely
26, at 494-507 (describing how the exclusionary rule in the 19th and 20th centuries developed in
cases involving illegal searches for liquor and explaining that once New York repealed its prohibition
law Benjamin Cardozo, then a judge on the New York Court of Appeals, famously found it easier to
reject the rule that the "the criminal should go free because the constable has blundered") (quoting
People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)).
88 Many of the key cases adopting exceptions to the rule originated in the states and involved
serious crimes. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (holding, in a California murder case,
that the rule does not apply to state cases in federal habeas proceedings); Massachusetts v. Sheppard,
468 U.S. 981 (1984) (concluding, in a Massachusetts murder case, that the good faith exception
applies to violations of the Particularity Clause); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (adopting, in a
Iowa murder case, the inevitable discovery doctrine).
89 See WILLIAM J. STUNTz, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 200-01 (2011)
(arguing that most Fourth Amendment jurisprudence developed in low-stakes Prohibition cases and
thus were "poor proxies" for regulating police tactics used in investigation of violent felonies and
felony thefts).
90 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
91 Id. ai 637 (stating that, since evidence seized through a search may have been destroyed
and that witnesses may have disappeared or have diminished memory, making retroactive the
"extraordinary procedural weapon" of exclusion, one "that has no bearing on guilt," "would seriously
disrupt the administration of justice"). Justice Clark, the author of Mapp, also wrote the majority
opinion in Linkletter.
92 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
9 Id. at 174 (holding that Fourth Amendment rights "may not be vicariously asserted").
94 For a recent treatment concluding, similar to my earlier arguments, that the rule does little
to discourage police harassment and decreases the benefit of the doubt accorded to defendants likely
to be innocent, see Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 585 (2011).
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reported in New York City for frisks95 (a rate possibly no better than chance96 ), or
the 10 to 35% hit rate for "probable cause" searches of cars reported in Maryland
and San Antonio, respectively.97  The much-higher success rate reported for
searches of homes may well be the result of the warrant requirement, not the
exclusionary rule.98 Professor Rosenthal is right to question whether a damages
action would be a better deterrent, and whether, even with a good faith exception
for individual liability, it might over-deter.99 But since no jurisdiction has
developed a meaningful damages remedy, the jury is still out on that issue as well,
just as it is with respect to the majestic conception rationale.
III. A COMPARATIVIST PERSPECTIVE
Perhaps we can learn something from other countries on both these points.
Only Professor Sundby among the symposium authors more than briefly mentions
the role of exclusion outside of the United States.'00 Although exceptions exist, 1 n
most countries do not favor suppression of evidence as a remedy for an illegal
search or seizure. Of greatest interest here is the fact that most countries in Europe
and the former British Commonwealth rarely exclude illegally seized evidence
and, when they do, it is usually only in cases where the police acted egregiously.' 02
This observation suggests several questions, briefly stated here.
9s GREG RIDGEWAY, ANALYSIS OF RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE NEW YORK POLICE
DEPARTMENT'S STOP, QUESTION, AND FRISK PRACTICES xi, xv, 39, 43 (2007) (finding that 6 to 10% of
over 500,000 stops resulted in arrests, mostly for drug offenses).
96 Cf City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35 (2000) (noting that 8.9% of the cars
stopped randomly at a roadblock contained evidence of crime).
9 Donald A. Dripps, The New Exclusionary Rule Debate: From "Still Preoccupied with
1985" to "Virtual Deterrence", 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 733, 772 (2011) (describing and analyzing
Maryland car search data); JOHN C. LAMBERTH, SAN ANTONIO RACIAL PROFILING DATA ANALYSIS
STUDY, FINAL REPORT FOR THE SAN ANTONIO POLICE DEPARTMENT 48 tbl. 8 (2003) (showing hit rates
for probable cause car searches of 34.9% for blacks and 40.1% for whites), available at
http://www.policeforum.org/library/racially-biased-policing/supplemental-
resources/San%20Antonio%20TX%20by%2OLamberth%2OConsulting[l].pdf.
98 See, e.g., Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San
Diego: Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. L. REv. 221,
249-50 (2000) (65% hit rate for warrant-based home searches).
9 Rosenthal, supra note 65, at 560. I address these arguments in Slobogin, supra note 67, at
405-20.
too See Sundby, supra note 64, at 399-400 n.29.
1o1 Id. (describing in particular Ireland's rejection of a good faith exception). Sundby does not
mention that Ireland has also refused to follow America's fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Director of Public Prosecutions v. Cash, I I.L.R.M. 389, paras. 41-42 (2010).
102 In Germany exclusion occurs only if the invasiveness of the action outweighs the
importance of the evidence or the seriousness of the crime, in France it is triggered only in
connection with a limited number of technical violations, and in Italy the rule is apparently also rarely
observed. See CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY 251-52 (Germany), 212 (France), 258
(Italy) (Craig Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). As for Commonwealth countries, in the United Kingdom
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Are the criminal courts in these other nations less wedded to the rule of law,
less prone to rely on "foundational" principles or perceived to be less legitimate
than American courts, as the arguments of Professors Clancy, Sundby, Cloud and
Taslitz suggest? If not, is that because suppression hearings aren't publicizing
police errors? Or is it because, in fact, exclusion isn't necessary to achieve these
majestic goals?
On the deterrence issue, are the police in these countries more likely to abuse
their search and seizure powers? If not, is that because police in these other
countries are intrinsically better behaved? Or is it because foreign governments
have developed alternative sanctions or institutional structures that work as well or
better than exclusion?
These hypotheses are worth studying. 10 3  A comparativist perspective also
raises questions about the effect of the rule on the police and attorneys. Some
comparativist scholars have speculated that the American adversarial system-an
important element of which is the exclusionary rule-breeds law enforcement
misbehavior by both prosecutors and police because of its win-at-all-costs
mentality.1" The exclusionary rule may also encourage excess on the other side.
There is no doubt that the rule provides an incentive for defense attorneys to
challenge not just obvious abuses but every police peccadillo.os Bill Stuntz even
conjectured that Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment challenges, made
tempting by the exclusionary remedy, distract defense attorneys from doing the
harder work of proving innocence.0M
exclusion occurs only if the police illegality was egregious, id. at 163, and the same appears to be true
in Australia. Frank Bates, Improperly Obtained Evidence and Public Policy: An Australian
Perspective, 43 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 379, 380 (1994). In Canada and New Zealand, the exclusionary
rule has become more robust in recent years, but it still focuses on factors such as "the seriousness of
the violation, . . . the impact of the illegal action on the defendant [and] the societal interest in the
adjudication of the case." William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. COLO. L.
REv. 679, 720-21 (2011). For the practice in Ireland, see supra note 101.
103 1 have laid out a research program in Christopher Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and
Police Investigative Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 321 (2011).
104 See William T. Pizzi, The American "Adversary System"?, 100 W.VA. L. REv. 847, 849
(1998) (asserting that while continental police work for both sides, the alignment of the police and the
prosecution in the United States is more likely "to produce police investigations that are biased,
slanted, or even distorted to favor conviction."); Mirjan Damaska, Structures of Authority and
Comparative Criminal Procedure, 84 YALE L.J. 480, 523 n.109 (1975) ("One factor that explains
differences in police behavior between continental and common law systems is the greater divergence
in the latter between what the police actually know and what can be introduced as evidence at trial.").
105 See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) (in which the defendant argued that
consent to search a car does not encompass consent to search a paper bag in the car); Hicks v.
Arizona, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (holding that moving a stereo set to see its serial number without
probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (in which
the defendant argued that the person who shared his duffel bag could not consent to a search of a
pocket in the bag, an argument that the Court called "metaphysical").
1o6 William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) ("By giving defendants other, cheaper claims to raise,
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Viewed from a comparativist perspective, the Fourth Amendment's
mandatory exclusionary rule is another example of American exceptionalism, like
the death penalty 07 and mass incarceration.108 It is worth pondering whether the
genesis of the rule is somehow related to these other practices, perhaps mediated
through the hyper-adversarial attitudes the American system encourages. 109 This
bigger picture is something to keep in mind when reading the scintillating essays in
this symposium.
constitutional criminal procedure . .. raises the cost to defense counsel of investigating and litigating
factual claims, claims that bear directly on their clients' innocence or guilt. The result is to steer
defense counsel, . . . at the margin, away from those sorts of claims and toward constitutional
issues.").
107 David Johnson, American Capital Punishment in Comparative Perspective, 36 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 1033, 1034 (2011) ("[A]ll other developed democracies except Japan have abandoned [the
death penalty] or stopped executing").
108 David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 28
(2011) ("Since the mid-1970s ... the U.S. incarceration rate has skyrocketed, while those of most of
our [Western] counterparts have either stayed relatively constant or increased at a much slower
rate.").
109 I develop this idea further in Christopher Slobogin, A Comparative Perspective on the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure Cases, in RESEARCH HANDBOOKS IN COMPARATIVE LAW:
CRIMINAL LAW (Jacqueline Ross & Stephen Thaman, eds., forthcoming 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-2247746.
2013] 355

